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INTRODUCTION
Fifty-year disturbance: the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and
exceptionalism in a South Asian periphery
Duncan McDuie-Ra*
School of Social Sciences and International Studies, University of New South Wales,
Australia
Northeast India is one of South Asia’s most contested spaces. Contestation has
taken multiple forms, from armed opposition to the Indian state to violence against
migrants, from movements for separate federal states and autonomous units to
struggles to control black market trade, from protests against extractive industries to
demands for more funds from the central government. Often overlooked in studies
of the Northeast is the centrality of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958
(AFSPA) in creating the environment in which contestation takes place. The AFSPA
has become the ‘elephant in the room’ when it comes to the Northeast, mentioned in
virtually every text but rarely examined beyond the rubric of security studies or
human rights. The papers in this special issue examine the impact of the AFSPA
after 50 years of operation. The content of the Act has changed little over 50 years,
with the most notable changes being only amendments to who is able to declare an
area disturbed and warrant the imposition of the Act in 1972 and a qualiﬁer on the
length of time for which a person can be detained resulting from a 1997 legal
challenge. Yet the Act has impacted on the Northeast, India, and South Asia in ways
that are profound and underexplored.
For the authors featured in this issue of Contemporary South Asia, the AFSPA is
far more than a legal framework providing impunity for members of the armed
forces engaged in the Northeast. The Act enforces a state of exception that allows
democracy to be permanently suspended and the peoples of the region to be under
permanent surveillance. Several authors refer to Agamben’s (2005) use of the state of
exception, although others, without referring to Agamben’s work, discuss the
dynamic in almost identical terms. The Act produces a culture where persons and
places are able to be classiﬁed as ‘disturbed’ and subject to de facto martial law. This
does not just aﬀect interactions between soldiers and civilians, but between the centre
and states, between the region’s industrial estates and their employees, between civil
society and government, between India and its neighbours.
Exceptionalism has its own culture, and within this culture identity politics are
heightened and refashioned, manifesting in rivalries between some communities and
also solidarities between others. The Act shapes the ways development monies are
distributed in the region, ensures that counter-insurgency imperatives are at the heart
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of planning and implementation, and that the power to set the development agenda
remains in the hands of the Indian Government. The Act reproduces the
construction of the unruly frontier region, of the undisciplined tribal, the backward
indigene. The Act divides power between the armed forces and armed militants,
leaving a space where politics is compromised and the peoples caught between
undertake struggles that have little prospect of success but invite a complete
rethinking of the forms resistance can take.
This introduction to the special issue begins by discussing the provisions of the
Act itself and the context in which it was legislated in the decade after Indian
independence. The sections that follow discuss the dimensions of exceptionalism
enforced by the AFSPA at the international, national, and local levels. At the
international level, the Act is primarily seen as a violation of basic human rights –
and international human rights organisations have pressured the Indian Govern-
ment to repeal the Act, to which there has been little response beyond reiterating the
necessity of the Act to maintain the security of India. At the national level,
discussions of the Act are far more complex and multidimensional. The question of
how such an extraordinary law can exist for ﬁve decades in the world’s largest
democracy demands analysis of the ways the Northeast is constructed at the national
level and the ways the AFSPA has built upon these constructions and also
reproduces them, reinforcing the state of exception. At the local level the AFSPA is
part of everyday life. While generalising about the local context in the Northeast is
diﬃcult, in much of the region the AFSPA generates a constant fear that seeps into
social relations on even the most basic level; visiting a relative, being introduced to a
stranger, visiting the market, travelling to college, or joining an association. Finally,
each of the four papers featured in the special issue will be introduced.
The AFSPA 1958
In August 1958 the Indian Parliament debated the adoption of the AFSPA to be
applied to the hill areas of Assam, particularly the Naga Hills, and the then Union
Territory of Manipur, to assist the Indian armed forces in ﬁghting armed opponents.
The AFSPA has been applied to the Northeast region of India since 1958 and it has
also been applied in Jammu and Kashmir as the Armed Forces (Jammu and
Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990 and in the Punjab as the Armed Forces (Punjab
and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act from 1983 to 1997. Despite these other
deployments, the focus of this special issue will be on the AFSPA in the Northeast
states as this is where the Act has been in place for 50 years, where it has been most
heavily embedded in institutions, politics, economics, and everyday life, and where
the Act has gained its symbolic status as a tool of state-making. Furthermore,
analysis of the contemporary politics of the Northeast region are less familiar than
the other areas subject to similar acts – thus the 50-year anniversary of the AFSPA
oﬀers an opportunity to re-examine the Northeast region during this particular
juncture in contemporary South Asia.
The Northeast refers to the wedge of land situated on the far-eastern periphery of
India. It is almost completely cut oﬀ from the rest of India, joined only by a narrow
tract of land at Siliguri in West Bengal. The Northeast is comprised of eight federal
states centred on the Brahmaputra and Barak river valleys and surrounding hill
ranges. The Northeast shares borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, China
(Tibet), and Nepal, and many of the peoples in the region have ethnic and linguistic
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links to Southeast Asia and the greater Himalayas. During the colonial era the hill
tracts were administered under special provisions and were classiﬁed as excluded or
partially excluded areas, restricting access to peoples from other parts of India and
also creating a diﬀerentiated system of rule accompanied by high levels of violence
directed at hill communities (Robb 1997). The hill areas of the Northeast became a
frontier for the plains of Bengal and colonial tea and oil interests in the Brahmaputra
valley. The ‘frontier’ mentality towards the region has been pervasive since Indian
independence and the creation of the landlocked region through the diﬀerent stages
of Partition (van Schendel 2005). The Northeast became a periphery; a curious
appendage to the rest of India. Alienation and neglect were followed by attempts at
integration and often assimilation, both responding to, and fuelling, claims for
secession, autonomy, and statehood from diﬀerent ethnic groups in the region. A
decade after independence, the Indian state had made little headway in pacifying
armed opposition in the Naga Hills and Manipur, and therefore implemented the
AFSPA.
The AFSPA can be applied to areas in all states of the Northeast with the
exception of Sikkim. It applies to any area declared ‘disturbed’ by the central
government. In such areas, the armed forces, including paramilitary forces –some of
which have been created especially for operations in the Northeast – are given
extraordinary powers. First, the Act allows ‘any commissioned oﬃcer, warrant
oﬃcer, non-commissioned oﬃcer or any other person of equivalent rank in the
armed forces’ to ﬁre ‘even to the causing of death’ upon any person acting in
contravention of any law or order, any person carrying weapons or anything capable
of being used as a weapon, and to prohibit the assembly of more than ﬁve people
Figure 1. The state of the Northeast and surrounding countries. Source: Map from
MoDONER (2008, 3).
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(Ministry of Home Aﬀairs 1958/1998, Section 4a). Secondly, the Act allows armed
forces personnel to arrest without warrant and with any necessary force ‘any person
who has committed a cognizable oﬀence or against whom a reasonable suspicion
exists that he has committed or is about to commit a cognizable oﬀence’ (Ministry of
Home Aﬀairs 1958/1998, Section 4c). Thirdly, the Act allows armed forces personnel
to enter and search any premises without a warrant to ‘make any such arrest’
(Ministry of Home Aﬀairs 1958/1998, Section 4d). Once a person has been arrested
under the Act, Section 5 instructs that they only be handed over to police with ‘the
least possible delay’, although this was amended in 1997 to recommend that persons
arrested be brought before a district magistrate within 24 hours, excluding
transportation time. The most signiﬁcant part of the Act is Section 6, which states:
No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the
previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything
done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act. (Ministry
of Home Aﬀairs 1958/1998, Section 6)
Derived from the British armed forces Special Powers Ordinance of 1942, which
conferred the power to arrest and kill on suspicion to the Armed Forces in the wake
of heightened nationalist agitations, the AFSPA of 1958 was intended to operate for
one year. During the parliamentary debate, both of the Members of the Parliament
from Manipur opposed the adoption of the Act – the member Mr. Laishram Achaw
Singh stating:
I fail to understand why the military authorities are to be invested with special powers. I
have found that these military authorities have always committed excesses in many
cases, especially in the sub-divisions of Kohima and Mokokchung [present-day
Nagaland] . . . such things have deteriorated the situation. The tribal people have risen
against the military people there. It is, therefore, dangerous to invest the military
authorities with extraordinary powers of killing and of arrest without warrant and of
house breaking . . . This is a lawless law . . . I am afraid that this measure will only sever
the right of the people and harass innocent folk and deteriorate the situation. (Singh
cited in Combat Law 2003)
Aside from Singh, few other objections were recorded. The AFSPA was made law on
11 September 1958 and retrospectively enacted toMay of the same year. Interestingly,
and perhaps prophetically, the circumstances Singh described in 1958 have become
the norm throughout much of the Northeast over the past 50 years.
The AFSPA is not applied uniformly across the states of the Northeast; it applies
in areas declared ‘disturbed’ by the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs or the Governor of the
respective state (Ministry of Home Aﬀairs 1958/1998, Section 3). Designating an
area as ‘disturbed’ previously had no time limit, but since a 1997 challenge by the
Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights, the designation must be reviewed
periodically every sixth months – yet there is no limit on the number of times this
designation can be renewed, eﬀectively meaning some areas can, and have been,
classiﬁed as disturbed for decades. The designation ‘disturbed’ is not open to judicial
review, nor can it be contested by state governments (South Asian Human Rights
Documentation Centre [SAHRDC] 1995), let alone local governments in the said
area or concerned civil society actors. As of 2008 much of the Northeast was
designated as ‘disturbed’, including: the areas of Arunachal Pradesh bordering
Assam, the entire state of Assam, the entire state of Manipur (with the periodic
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exception of parts of the Imphal Valley), a large corridor of Meghalaya bordering
Assam, the entire state of Nagaland, and the hill areas of Tripura (Human Rights
Watch 2008, 8–14). The only states with no ‘disturbed areas’ are Sikkim, only
recently included and administered as part of Northeast India, and Mizoram. The
removal of ‘disturbed’ status in Mizoram was the result of a peace accord between
the Indian Government and the Mizo National Front in 1986, resulting in the
creation of Mizoram as a state. Yet prior to this Mizoram was a ‘disturbed’ area for
19 years, and before this, in 1966, was bombed by the Indian Air Force (Dommen
1967).
In this environment, militant groups have thrived and the number of insurgent
groups in the Northeast has increased dramatically since the AFSPA has been in
operation. Indeed, as will be discussed by several authors in this special issue, 50
years of the AFSPA has closed all avenues for non-violent forms of contestation.
While militancy has increased in some areas, it has decreased in others. Importantly,
militant groups do not always receive widespread popular support from the
communities that they claim to represent. Again this is not uniform; in some parts of
the region, militant groups enjoy deep community support and legitimacy, as
throughout the Mizo struggle; in others, they are viewed as an antisocial element
involved in organised crime and extortion, as in parts of Meghalaya for instance.
The increase in militancy has been used to argue that the Act is ineﬀective and that it
has actually made the situation in the Northeast worse, yet it is also used by the Act’s
proponents as proof that the Act should not be repealed and extraordinary powers
are necessary (Baruah 2005, 63).
International dimensions
At the international level, the Act is primarily discussed as a violation of basic
human rights and India’s international obligations. It has been argued that the Act
violates several core human rights norms, including the right to life by enabling
members of the armed forces to shoot to kill (Section 4a), the right to liberty and
security by enabling armed forces to arrest and detain anyone suspected of
committing or being about to commit any ‘cognizable oﬀence’ with no clearly
speciﬁed period of release (Section 4c), the right to remedy by ensuring that no
charges can be brought against the armed forces for any of their actions (Section 6),
and it creates an environment where the right to be free from torture and from cruel
or degrading treatment can be violated, and indeed allegations of torture, rape, and
abuse at the hands of the armed forces operating under the Act abound (Human
Rights Watch 2008, 6–7).
Since the 1990s major international human rights organisations such Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, the Asian Centre for Human Rights, and
several diﬀerent United Nations Agencies have released reports on human rights
violations under the AFSPA and made recommendations to the Indian Government.
In March 2009 Navanethem Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
visited New Delhi to address the National Human Rights Commission and a number
of state-level commissions. In his speech Pillay urged the Indian Government to
repeal ‘those dated and colonial-era laws that breach contemporary international
human rights standards’, particularly ‘laws which provide the security forces with
excessive emergency powers, including the Armed Forces Special Powers Act’
(National Human Rights Council 2009).
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In its 2008 report Getting Away with Murder, Human Rights Watch pointed out
that, aside from violating international human rights norms and treaties, the AFSPA
provides impunity for the armed forces and paramilitary. Impunity is present in two
forms; de facto impunity in which the state fails to prosecute due to lack of will or
capacity, and de jure impunity in which laws protect perpetrators of human rights
abuse, making it extremely diﬃcult to bring cases against perpetrators (Human
Rights Watch 2008, 16–17). The AFSPA provides de jure impunity in that members
of the armed forces are not prosecuted in civilian courts, and under the provisions of
the Act many human rights violations are not deemed criminal. Yet it also provides a
form of de facto impunity as military courts responsible for prosecuting soldiers have
often failed to investigate human rights violations or been ‘simply unwilling’ to bring
charges against military personnel (Human Rights Watch 2008, 18).
Reports from the Asian Centre for Human Rights have focused on the ways the
AFSPA has facilitated torture. A 2008 report provides evidence to demonstrate that,
despite a 1997 amendment to the AFSPA that any person arrested under the Act
must be handed over to civilian authorities within 24 hours, this is frequently ignored
(Asian Centre for Human Rights 2008a, 36). In the cases, cited persons arrested have
been detained for periods ranging from one week to several months. These periods of
detention have facilitated torture, rape, and murder by the armed forces, including
rape and torture of children (Asian Centre for Human Rights 2008a, 36–39). The
Asian Centre for Human Rights publicises violations by the armed forces in its
annual India Human Rights Report. The reports detail human rights violations in
each state in India, and the AFSPA ﬁgures prominently in violations in the
Northeast. In the Manipur section of the 2008 report, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary
arrest, illegal detention, torture, and violence against women are all documented
(Asian Centre for Human Rights 2008b, 105–111). This is followed by several pages
documenting similar incidents by armed opposition groups.
Perhaps most interesting is attention to the AFSPA by the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination at the United Nations. During the 70th session
in early 2007, the Committee responded to India’s submissions by expressing
concern that the AFSPA had not yet been repealed and that armed forces continue
to act with impunity in states that are ‘inhabited by tribal peoples’ (Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2007, 3). In eﬀect, the AFSPA is being
contested by the committee on the grounds that it discriminates against tribal
peoples. Race is very rarely brought into discussions of the AFSPA in India, where
racism is predominantly viewed as a colonial form of power and control or
something experienced by Indian nationals in other countries, rather than an
embedded aspect of state-making in the exceptional Northeast.
The exposure of human rights violations under the AFSPA is aimed at appealing
to India’s commitments and obligations under the international human rights
framework. For example, Amnesty International states that the AFSPA violates
core aspects of human rights ‘as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which India is a state party since 1979’ (Amnesty
International 2006, 5). India has been able to respond by arguing that the AFSPA is
necessary to deal with a major internal security threat. This is where the state of
exception appears in its simplest form; under normal circumstances, such laws would
not be necessary; but given the exceptional circumstances, the AFSPA is regrettable
but necessary. For example, General J.J. Singh as Chief of Army Staﬀ said of calls to
repeal the Act in 2005, ‘we are ﬁghting an unequal battle . . . we need some sort of
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legal protection. Otherwise the army will be dragged to court every second day based
on allegations against us’ (Telegraph 2005). A further tactic has been to attribute
blame for insurgency on ‘foreign hands’, located in Bangladesh, China, and
Pakistan.
At the international level, particularly in interactions between states, attention to
human rights violations is often couched in arguments around democracy,
dictatorship, discriminatory laws, and crimes against humanity during civil war.
India’s status as the world’s largest democracy means that reports heavily critical of
the AFSPA and other human rights violations in India generate much less attention
than those aimed at regularly viliﬁed states. After all, India has been perhaps the
most successful postcolonial democracy anywhere, and certainly in South Asia.
Federalism, the panchayati system of directly elected district-level and village-level
governance, reservations aimed at redressing discrimination, and a vibrant civil
society have all been lauded, although rarely without qualiﬁers (Dasgupta 2001;
Kumar 2006; Lijphart 1996/2001). Indeed, several authors have argued that the
strengths of Indian democracy are its perseverance despite signiﬁcant odds (Jayal
2001; Kohli 2001). Threats to this democracy are usually attributed to commun-
alism, nationalism, diasporic meddling, and Hindu fundamentalism (Nussbaum
2007), rarely to state-sanctioned suspensions of democracy and militarisation in
border regions. Indian democracy is to be supported and preserved in a rough
neighbourhood rather than overtly challenged.
This is particularly true of human rights violations in the Northeast, a part of
India and South Asia that receives very little outside attention. While international
pressure has emanated from the most prominent human rights actors thus far, the
central government has resisted repealing the Act. The capacity to defend the Act is
derived from the state of exception applied to the Northeast in India. International
pressure to repeal the Act has less leverage as the Act is applied to a region of India
that is considered so extraordinary that rules, laws, and moral codes do not apply in
the same way as in other parts of India. The exceptionalism of the Northeast is the
focus of the following section.
National dimensions
The provisions of the AFSPA are extraordinary by any measure. This raises the
question of how has such an extraordinary law persisted in India’s democratic polity
for 50 years? In that 50 years there have been legal challenges, review committees,
and mass protests, yet only minor indications from the government that the Act may
be revised let alone repealed. The question is even more pertinent when one considers
the repeal of other extraordinary laws in India, particularly the Prevention of
Terrorism Act 2002 (POTA) and the Terrorism and Destructive Activities Act 1985,
and the high-level public and parliamentary debate over the National Security Act
1980, the Preventive Detention Act 1950, and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act
1967/2004 (UAPA), leading to amendments in certain cases (Kalhan et al. 2007;
Singh 2007).
One possible answer common to all of the papers featured in this special issue
comes from the ways the Northeast itself is situated, materially and ideationally, in
postcolonial India. As all of the authors in the present issue argue, the Northeast is
an exceptional territory; ethnically, geographically, politically, socially, and
constitutionally. While India contains diverse regions and a holistic national polity
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or even coherent national society is not always identiﬁable, there is a distance
between the Northeast and the rest of India that is qualitatively diﬀerent to that
between other regions in India, and between these regions and the central
government. While regions and peoples throughout India are constructed and
viewed diﬀerently to each other and these diﬀerences are pronounced and often
articulated forcefully at the local level, they still ﬁt into the larger nation, although
rarely seamlessly, in ways that the Northeast does not.
There is a strong belief in both the Indian ‘mainland’ and in most of the
Northeast itself that the diﬀerent states, autonomous units, and peoples grouped
together as ‘the Northeast’ will never be able to be part of India in the same ways as
other diverse groups of peoples have been accommodated. There is a binary between
the peoples of the Northeast and peoples in other parts of India. Rarely explicitly
articulated in mainstream politics, this binary is constant in any interaction between
the states of the Northeast and the central government and, crucially, between the
armed forces and the peoples of ‘disturbed areas’. The Northeast is exceptional and
the rest of India is normal. This binary is bridged in certain ways, such as by
particular individuals migrating to the rest of India to live and work, and vice versa,
and through certain networks such as women’s organisations, environmentalists,
and human rights activists. Yet in the majority of interactions this binary is constant.
This binary structures the ways the Northeast is perceived externally in India and
beyond, discussed throughout the articles in this special issue and in much of
the literature on the region (Baruah 1999, 2005; Hazarika 1995), and exacerbates the
distance between the ‘mainland’ and the Northeast. In the rest of India, the
construction of the Northeast has a number of components. First, the region is
portrayed as being endlessly and incurably violent. Building upon colonial
classiﬁcations of peoples of the region as savage, predominantly used to justify
their violent subjugation, the category ‘tribal’ in contemporary India continues to
reproduce the stereotypes that enable the region to be constructed as a violent
borderland, a distant and disturbed periphery of ‘undiﬀerentiated’ and ‘nameless
insurgencies’ (Baruah 2005, vii), where people owe allegiances to kin and clan ties
and hereditary rulers over secular modern institutions, and respond to emotion over
rationality (Singh 2002, 39). Secondly, and in some cases contradictorily, the peoples
of the region are portrayed as ‘simple’ and unable to cope with the demands of
citizenship in the modern state (Miri 2005; Prasad 2003). At the popular level, this
component is extended to include notions that tribals are gullible, lazy, and
frequently intoxicated. Far from an archaic view, scholars are often surprised at how
embedded these stereotypes are in other parts of India and within the Northeast
itself. This has been the catalyst for constitutional protection for many of the ethnic
groups in the region embodied in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution and
Scheduled Tribe status, provisions both derided for prolonging the region’s
‘isolation’ (Johri 1962) and celebrated for protecting ethnic and cultural rights and
control over land (Gassah 1998). The need for protection has been used by many
ethno-nationalist movements to demand autonomy and to diﬀerentiate themselves
from cunning and predatory societies in other parts of India (Xaxa 1999). Thirdly,
the economy of the region is viewed as being ‘under-developed’ and its peoples
‘backward’ and thus in need of paternal guidance from the Indian state (McDuie-Ra
2008). National security imperatives are an important part of this paternalism, and
as a result development and economic planning are highly centralised through the
Ministry of Development for the Northeast Region, and aided by the economic
dependence of states from the Northeast on the central government for the majority
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of their budgets leaving states little room to negotiate on how money will be spent
and how resources will be utilised.
Within the Northeast the rest of India is constructed in slightly more complex
ways. Those most commonly identiﬁed are the feelings of alienation, neo-colonial
control, occupation, and domination that are discussed thoroughly in existing
literature, and are a major part of identity narratives, party politics, and civil society.
However, peoples from the region interact with the ‘national’ in many ways. The
Indian state has a major presence in the Northeast. The state makes its presence felt
in the visual and cultural landscape of the Northeast, especially in urban areas, and
the state is also responsible for the establishment and maintenance of many of the
institutions through which peoples’ lives are determined, such as the state
government and departments, the Sixth Schedule, reservations in government
employment, and the military. Many of the region’s peoples interact with the state,
and in many cases identify with it through holding Indian citizenship, employment in
the civil service, the national education system, and social and political networks
between the Northeast and the rest of India.
However, while there are spaces and interactions that bridge the distance between
the Northeast and the rest of India, the region is predominately constructed
externally and internally as an exception. Crucial to this exception is the idea that the
region is a work in progress. Military occupation, the creation of federal states,
centrally directed development and resource extraction, the provision for reserva-
tions for people in the region to study and work in other parts of India, are all part of
the ongoing process of state-making in the Northeast; a process that aims to bring
the Northeast ‘up’ to the level of development and sophistication of the rest of India.
Parallels with colonial state-making are clearly evident. Paternalism and special
provisions are combined with extraordinary laws and military occupation.
The state of exception in the Northeast is permanent not temporary. In his
detailed study of extraordinary laws in India, Singh argues that exceptional contexts
only gain meaning when compared with normal contexts, and thus ‘the normal . . .
stands outside and parallel to the exception, and yet is integrally related to it . . . the
exception cannot have any meaning unless there is a normal situation that oﬀsets it’
(2007, 19) Considering the ways the Northeast has been brought into colonial and
postcolonial state-making, it is diﬃcult to assume it would ever be considered normal
provided it remains part of India. The AFSPA is central to this, as it ensures ‘entire
populations . . . may be externalised and distanced from the (national) political
community’, excluding the people of the region as the ‘enemy within’ (Singh 2007,
310).
As an extraordinary law governing an exceptional place, the AFSPA has not
been subject to national political debate in the same way as other Acts that aﬀect
peoples with greater political representation at the centre. The POTA was vigorously
opposed and made a national election issue by the Congress in 2004, leading to its
removal. The Terrorism and Destructive Activities Act 1985 was allowed to lapse
after 10 years and was not renewed. The UAPA has undergone several major
amendments, although admittedly many of these amendments have made the law
more draconian as it has absorbed elements of the POTA. Yet the AFSPA remains
in place. Recommendations for its repeal, as will be seen below, are readily countered
by the seemingly logical national security argument. As Singh argues, this has meant
that struggles for human rights and justice in the face of these laws are themselves
‘imputed with extraordinariness’ and are quickly juxtaposed to ‘notions of national
sovereignty, national security, national integrity, and national interest’ (2007, 29).
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In defence of the Act, the Northeast is cited as too violent, too unstable, and too
strategically valuable to allow it to be ‘lost’ to militants (Kamboj 2004).
Several committees have been established to review the AFSPA in India. The two
most recent are the Reddy Committee in 2005 and the Administrative Reforms
Commission, also known as the Moily Commission, in 2007. The former will be the
focus here as it best epitomises the dimensions of the AFSPA at the national level.
The Reddy Commission was assembled by the Indian Government in the wake of the
protests in Manipur in 2004 at the rape and murder of Manorama Devi (see
Gaikwad, present issue). Headed by former Supreme Court Justice B.P. Jeevan
Reddy, the Reddy Commission toured the Northeast in early 2005, accepting
submissions from communities, lawyers, activists, academics, and members of local
government. The commission also took submissions from the armed forces. The
committee’s report was submitted to the Prime Minister in June 2005. This was
followed by silence. The recommendations of the report were not released. After
more than a year the report appeared on The Hindu newspaper’s web site, before
parts of the report were leaked to other media and civil society actors.
Given the unwillingness of the government to release the report, it is unsurprising
to discover the Reddy Commission recommended that the AFSPA be repealed. The
report declared the Act to be too vague, easily abused, and that it had become a
symbol of ‘oppression’ in the Northeast (Chasie and Hazarika 2009, 1). In a visit to
Manipur in December 2006, the Prime Minister was quoted as saying the Act would
be ‘humanised’ rather than repealed (SAHRDC 2006). Despite recommending
repeal, the Reddy Committee did not recommend that the armed forces leave the
Northeast and the UAPA should be further revised to take on certain provisions of
the AFSPA (Baruah 2007, 5).
The UAPA was amended in 2004 after the very controversial POTA law was
repealed. Aspects of the POTA were rolled into the amended UAPA, allowing
various kinds of activities and organisations to be regarded as ‘unlawful’ or
‘terrorist’ and allowing suspected individuals to be arrested and organisations to be
banned with no requirement for ratiﬁcation or juridical review (Kalhan et al. 2007,
105, 125). Given the ways that civil society and government opponents have been
harassed and banned throughout the Northeast, there is grounds to assume this
would continue and possibly increase under the UAPA. It is signiﬁcant that the
Reddy Commission suggested absorbing the AFSPA into the UAPA on the grounds
that the UAPA applied to all of India, and thus the process of absorbing the AFSPA
would reduce the feeling of discrimination felt by the people of the Northeast
(SAHRDC 2006). In the end this was rejected. The process reveals what Baruah
describes as the ‘impasse in India policy towards the Northeast’ (2007, 5). A high-
level committee recommends repeal of the AFSPA, the Indian Government
suppresses the report, but even the report itself does not recommend the removal
of the armed forces or the repeal of extraordinary laws, only this particular law, and
only because it may lessen feelings of exceptionalism, decreasing the attractions of
insurgency. Despite this, the Indian Government was still not prepared to dismantle
the exceptional status of the Northeast.
Local dimensions
At the local level the AFPSA is more than an extraordinary law. The AFSPA is the
legal framework for the military occupation of the region and the subsequent
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militarisation of everyday life. Armed personal are encountered on the roads, in the
main towns, in the markets, and in border areas. Military cantonments and bases
occupy the centre of state capitals, strategic hills, bridges and border crossings.
Members of the armed forces frequently stop vehicles to search passengers and
cargo. Check-points are numerous, heavily curtailing movement. Members of the
diﬀerent border security forces routinely stop civilians in the proximity of borders.
As Kikon describes in her article, persons found in proximity of borders in the
Northeast, even internal borders between states, are routinely regarded as suspicious
and can be subject to harassment, detention, and death. Stopping, searching and
questioning have made everyday life oppressive for most people in ‘disturbed areas’.
After 50 years, many people in the region have known no other situation.
Incidences of murder, rape, and torture reported at the hands of the armed forces
and by militant groups impute a deep sense of fear and uncertainty in everyday life.
This shapes the choices people make about their own movements and those of their
family members, especially when movement may be necessary for education,
employment, livelihoods, and healthcare. Movement, even within the region, usually
always requires interactions with the armed forces, perpetuating the fear that each
search, each routine questioning, each suspicion on the part of the armed forces
could escalate into violence or detention, and under the protection of the AFSPA
there is no way to prevent this happening or to seek justice when it does.
Fear of the armed forces, and also militants, is not restricted to people’s
interactions in public. The AFSPA enables the search of any premises without
warrant on mere suspicion of diﬀerent oﬀences. For many people in the Northeast,
the home, the private sphere, provides no shelter from harassment and violence.
Even for people in the region whose interactions with the armed forces have never
involved more than a cursory glance or the unpacking of luggage at a checkpoint, the
fear that they could be apprehended at any moment or that their houses could be
entered by armed men or that a family member may not return from work is
entrenched. After 50 years this has placed an extreme psychological burden on
people and communities in the region.
There are gendered aspects to this fear and psychological burden. As Chenoy
argues, women in the Northeast ‘are routinely questioned on the thinnest of pretexts
and are thus exposed to sexual harassment’ (2002, 132). Sexual violence directed
against women by the armed forces has been widely publicised and contested by
activists throughout the Northeast and in other parts of India (see Gaikwad, present
issue). However, those who experience sexual violence are not the only ones deeply
aﬀected by the militarisation of the Northeast, despite being perhaps the most
visible. Goswami, Sreekala, and Goswami’s (2005, 19) study of women in armed
conﬂict in the region identiﬁes six categories of women aﬀected: women relatives of
armed activists, women relatives of state armed forces, women militants or
combatants, women as shelter providers, women as victims of sexual and physical
abuse, woman as peace negotiators, women as rights activists. They argue that in a
militarised society, even in locations where actual armed conﬂict is minimal, violence
against women is far higher than in non-militarised societies (Goswami, Sreekala,
and Goswami 2005, 34). This is evident in the very high levels of violence against
women recorded in the Northeast states in various Indian Government reports,
exempliﬁed by Meghalaya having the second highest level in all of India in a 2002
national report, despite a predominately and oft-celebrated matrilineal society
(McDuie-Ra 2007). Race and gender intersect in harassment and violence directed
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towards tribal women, particularly by non-tribal members of the armed forces.
Tribal women are perceived to be less bound by moral codes that apply to women in
other parts of India, more sexually available, and somehow seen to be inviting sexual
attention by their dress or their capacity to move around without male companions,
magnifying the fear in any interactions with the armed forces.
Frequently overlooked are the ways that the AFSPA and a militarised Northeast
aﬀect men, particularly young men from hill areas and from upper-Assam. Young
men are proﬁled as insurgents by the military and are the targets of recruitment by
insurgents. They are subject to pressures and harassment from both sides.
Movement, employment, education, and social networks are all jeopardised in this
environment. Young men who move in groups attract high levels of suspicion and
harassment, yet young men who move around on their own are far more vulnerable
to harassment and without a companion it can be diﬃcult to trace individuals when
disappearances occur. The psychological impact militarisation has on young men is
rarely examined beyond being a catalyst to join militant groups and/or the armed
forces. Attention from scholars and civil society is given to combatants and to the
role of men in ethno-nationalist and student movements, but little attention is given
to the impacts of militarisation on non-combatants, particularly the long-term
psychological impacts of living in this environment.
TheAFSPAand the counter-insurgency culture has bred a symbolic presence at the
local level that constantly enforces the extraordinariness of the Northeast and the
presence of the Indian state as an occupying force (seeFarrelly, present issue).Any time
spent travelling in the Northeast will quickly acquaint visitors with the very visible
physical presence of the various military and paramilitary units, but also the intense
public relations paraphernalia that adorns barracks, markets, public events, stadiums,
and highways. Recently, photographs of members of certain battalions surrounded by
children from tribal villages or from a school or sports club have appeared at the gates
to barracks in diﬀerent parts of the region. Reading this symbolism is complex and
inevitably symbolises diﬀerent things to diﬀerent peoples. Although at a certain level
such symbols signify surveillance and occupation, they also signify integration and
paternalism, capturing both the exception and the relationship with the normal. In
many ways this resembles the everyday experiences with the AFSPA at the local level
where exceptionality has become familiar, where exceptionality is the norm.
Papers in this special issue
The papers in this special issue approach the AFSPA as far more than a legal
framework, and posit that after 50 years the impact of the Act on aspects of life
within and outside the Northeast have been phenomenal. Common to all these
papers is the state of exception. Despite the changes that the Act has brought to the
region and its peoples, much of the ideological framework underpinning the Act has
changed little over 50 years. Indeed, it seems to have been further entrenched. Legal
challenges, commissions, reports, protests, and a proliferation of armed groups have
not signiﬁcantly altered the ways the region is governed, the way it is conceived in the
national imaginary, or the prospects of peace.
The ﬁrst paper, by Dolly Kikon, deconstructs the relationship between justice
and law to explore the ways the Indian state has been able to legitimise lawlessness
through the AFSPA. Kikon uses Derrida’s separation of law and justice that extends
justice beyond legal paradigms and deconstructs the assumption that the rule of law
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is equivalent to justice to examine the AFSPA. The violent enforcement of justice is
legitimised by the normalisation of the binary between crime and justice. In the
Northeast this is highly problematic as legal practices have diﬀerent meanings and
impacts among citizens. For the inhabitants of the Northeast, their status as Indian
citizens has been destabilised by their peripheral locations on the margins of the
Indian legal system. This has created an AFSPA culture in which the terms
‘disturbed area’ and ‘suspicion’ have enabled the region to become a ‘site of
surveillance, aberration and contradictions’ in which people in the Northeast ‘deﬁne
and negotiate justice’ as inherently unequal citizens (Kikon 2009, 278).
The paper illustrates this with a detailed account of the murder of Nilikesh Gogoi
by the Central Industrial Security Force, one of the many paramilitary forces
operating in the Northeast. Kikon unravels the ways justice is played out in the
militarised terrain around the oil ﬁelds and plantations along the Assam–Nagaland
border area. The diﬀerent accounts of justice understood by the state and by local
inhabitants suggest that a shared understanding of rights and justice is non-existent,
and this incoherence has led to the imposition of structures of power by the state that
serve to regulate daily life. These structures of power mean that the inhabitants of
disturbed areas have no guarantee that their rights will be protected, and instead, as
in the case of the local people who initially protested against Gogoi’s murder but
eventually compromised, must negotiate and adapt to existing power relations
enforced by extraordinary law. Thus for Kikon, the AFSPA is a culture that has
militarised social relations in the Northeast. In ‘disturbed’ areas the AFSPA must be
examined beyond a legal framework that focuses on repeal or modiﬁcation; instead,
it is important to focus on the moral framework imposed by the Act.
The second paper, by Nicholas Farrelly, examines the ceaseﬁre regimes in the
Indo-Burmese borderlands, comparing the actions of the diﬀerent governments to
long-running insurgencies. For Farrelly, the Northeast is a site of cultural, political,
and economic intersection, yet also is a site that cannot escape the ways it has been
constructed in colonial and postcolonial state-building as a frontier that has been
extremely diﬃcult to govern. This has provided the continued impetus to extend the
structures of the modern Indian state to the Northeast, yet the AFSPA ensures that
democratic norms characteristic of the Indian polity are suspended within the
broader mission of national cohesion. Central to this mission are the complimentary
and contradictory initiatives that continue to reproduce the state of exception in the
Northeast through measures aimed at protection of the region’s peoples through
inner-line permits, protection of tribal land and political institutions, and generous
ﬁnancial incentives to leave militant groups, yet also aimed at securitisation through
the AFSPA, the omnipresent military, and the system of governance that rewards
loyal elites at the state level and breeds incessant corruption. Farrelly terms this a
‘pattern of controlled ambiguities’ (Farrelly 2009, 298), in which ambiguous laws
such as the AFSPA hold legitimacy.
Much of the unravelling of this argument takes place through a comparative
investigation of the diﬀerent approaches taken by the Indian and Myanmar
governments to achieve ceaseﬁres in the Northeast and the Kachin state,
respectively. In doing so, Farrelly demonstrates that the AFSPA is about more
than security; it is also about economics. For people in the Northeast, the armed
forces are not simply a symbol of control; a neo-colonial occupying force. They are
also a source of employment and wealth. Farrelly challenges the conventional
assumption that all politics in the Northeast revolves around anti-national
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sentiment. Indeed, recruitment into the armed forces is about more than just
personal wealth and the social status that comes from a government job; many
people in the region also feel compelled to defend India. This raises the rarely
discussed existence of dual-identities in the region; generally expressed as ethnic
identity and Indian national identity. Even as anti-national movements have become
entrenched, individuals do not always choose between one and the other. When the
choice is made to take up arms against the Indian state, the AFSPA operates to
counter this, but it also operates ‘in conjunction with a set of equally ambiguous
ﬁnancial incentives, and social and political exceptions, that are largely absent from
discussions of the law’s implementation’ (Farrelly 2009, 289). Farrelly focuses on the
remuneration oﬀered to militants for surrender, agreement to undertake vocational
training, and for handing in weapons, with prices for the latter depending on the
weapon itself. This encapsulates the ironies of exception in the Northeast, which
allow the AFSPA to continue.
The third paper, by Namrata Gaikwad, focuses on the ways protests against the
AFSPA by women in Manipur are carried out in an unstable and shifting ground.
She questions not only the AFSPA and the ‘quasi’ colonisation of Manipur, but the
very capacity of conventional methods of analysis to deconstruct protests against the
Act and understand them within a rationalist framework that searches for means
and ends. Using the naked protests by members of the Meira Paibis at the barracks
of the Assam Riﬂes paramilitary forces in 2004 after the rape and murder of
Manorama Devi and the ongoing fast since 2000 of Irom Sharmila in protest against
the AFSPA, she examines the forms of expression that people adopt when caught
between the Indian armed forces and their armed opponents. Action that seeks to
transcend entrenchment may never lead to the removal of the AFSPA, but to
overlook such action is to overlook the ways it confronts injustice and inequalities.
In her ﬁrst example, Gaikwad examines the ways the Meira Paibis used their
bodies as weapons against the state. Their naked protest and unfurling of banners
calling upon the Indian Army to rape them received attention throughout the
mainstream press in India, yet the complexities of the Act of protest defy rational
explanation. In her second example, the ongoing fast of Irom Sharmila, Gaikwad
oﬀers the metaphor of the haunting to describe the ﬁgure of Sharmila. The response
of the state to Sharmila’s fast has been to keep her alive at all costs and thus her body
has become a site where the dynamics of conﬂict are re-enacted. The Indian state
cannot allow Sharmila to die as they risk being revealed as ‘murderous and
emasculated in the same gesture’ (Gaikwad 2009, 308), thus as each year passes the
ﬁgure of Sharmila continues to haunt the state. Her body has taken on a meaning
that allows us to move beyond rationalist debates for and against the AFSPA and
focus instead on the extraordinary protest; transcendental and divine, which is
beyond the control of the state, haunting its actions and its Special Powers Act.
The ﬁnal paper, by Duncan McDuie-Ra, departs slightly from the content of the
previous articles to study the ways the state of exception shape development in the
region and relationships with neighbouring countries. As India seeks to create
stronger economic links with Southeast Asia, China, and to further integrate the
economies of Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal into its orbit, the Northeast has had to
be rethought in ways that are conducive to opening borders, allowing greater
movement of goods and peoples, and shifting the ways economic development has
been conducted in the region from the neo-colonial extractive model to a more
participatory approach. This is embodied in the Indian Government’s North East
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Region Vision 2020 document released in 2008. The document seeks to recreate the
Northeast as a conduit for regional integration, transforming it from a periphery to a
corridor. To achieve India’s development vision and aspiration for intra-regionals
and inter-regional cooperation, the Northeast is required to become less of an
exception and more of a cog in the Indian economic wheel.
McDuie-Ra argues that, while a new vision for the region is important, the
persistence of the counter-insurgency mindset through more than ﬁve decades
ensures that the approach outlined in the Vision 2020 is subject to contradictory
politics. Each measure designed to bring normalcy to the northeast is countered by
measures to enforce its exceptionality. Not only is this dysfunctional as it does not
provide any of the basic needs that many people in the region are denied and will
serve to exacerbate grievances against the state, but it also shows that despite
recognition of past development failures, each successive revelatory report on
development needs in the region continues to oﬀer the same solutions underpinned
by the state of exception and each measure will continue to be assessed with regard
to counter-insurgency. McDuie-Ra closes by arguing that the new vision for the
Northeast is very much a ‘re-vision’ of the state of exception ﬁrst legislated in the
AFSPA, and that although the Indian state may be willing to try to alter this
mindset, it may not be capable of doing so.
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